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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The original brief of Appellant was filed with the Supreme 
Court for the State of Utah on November 1, 1993. Pursuant to Rule 
42, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and an order of the Supreme 
Court, dated November 24, 1993, this matter was transferred to the 
Court of Appeals. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes or ordinances 
which are at issue for this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF REPLY ARGUMENTS 
The primary issue before this court is whether or not the 
trial court had sufficient evidence to find for counterclaimant, 
John Prince, and enter a monetary judgment against Fred Healey. 
One of the issues at trial was whether or not an entity known 
as Income Fund should have been included in the transfer of assets. 
The trial court found there was sufficient evidence which would 
require the transfer of Income Fund. Appellant has not made any 
issues regarding Income Fund on appeal, yet the principal argument 
set forth in the responsive brief of Appellee is that Income Fund 
should have been included in the transfer. That issue is not 
before this court. 
The bulk of Appellant's brief was addressed towards the lack 
of evidence which the trial Court had, or in this case did not 
have, to render substantial monetary judgments against Fred Healey. 
In the responsive brief of Appellee, there is only cursory argument 
with regard to those money judgments, and at no time does Appellee 
set forth any reasonable evidence for the Court making that 
decision, and does not in any way refute the evidence which is set 
forth in Appellant's brief to show there was not a basis to enter 
the monetary judgments against Fred Healey. 
Appellee attempts to set forth certain arguments regarding 
Appellant's failure to set forth the value of the partnership 
assets at the time of trial now precludes and order of the Court 
allowing the enforcement of the original Memorandum Agreement 
entered into between the parties. There is no legal basis for 
making such assertions, and therefore that portion of Appellee's 
brief is improperly before this Court. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Appellant, Fred Healey, (hereinafter "Healey"), by and through 
his counsel, Les F. England, hereby files with the above-captioned 
Court the following reply to those arguments and allegations as set 
forth in the Brief of Appellee. 
Rather than give a detailed and redundant recitation of the 
arguments as contained in both Appellant's brief and Appellee's 
brief, Appellant will respond directly to those arguments as set 
forth in the Brief of Appellee. 
REPLY NO. 1 
THE TRANSFER OF INCOME FUND IS NOT AN 
ISSUE FOR THE APPELLATE COURT TO ADDRESS 
The First Argument and Second Argument, as set forth in the 
brief of Appellee (hereinafter referred to as "Prince"), sets forth 
arguments which are not at issue for this appeal. Prince spends 
substantial time, space and effort in his brief setting forth 
conclusions of law and findings of fact as to why the trial court 
was correct in determining that the entity known as Income Fund was 
included in the parties original agreement, and therefore properly 
determined by the trial court to be the property of Prince. Prince 
spends an inordinate amount of argument, strictly for the sake of 
argument, setting forth issues which are not before this Court. 
Simply put, the transfer of Income Fund to Prince, as required 
by the trial court, has not been advanced by Healey as an issue to 
be determined on appeal. While it is true that Healey does not 
agree with the trial court, and does not believe Income Fund should 
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have been included in the transfer of assets, Healey does not 
assert in this appeal that the finding of Judge Frederick in that 
regard were an abuse of discretion, nor founded on an insufficient 
factual basis. 
The only basis for inclusion of the Income Fund entity in the 
issues on appeal is whether or not the failure by Healey to 
transfer Income Fund was a material breach of the Memorandum 
Agreement. As set forth in both parties original briefs, the 
Memorandum Agreement is the only written agreement between the 
parties, and said agreement was the basis for the original 
complaint as filed by Healey against Prince. 
Throughout trial there was no dispute as to whether Income 
Fund was included or not included in the transfer of assets between 
the parties. Prince felt, at some point, that Income Fund should 
have been included. Healey felt, early on, that Income Fund was 
not one of the entities that was included in the transfer of 
assets, because the parties did not have joint control over Income 
Fund. The dispute at trial was the parties interpretation of the 
agreement, not the actual transfer or lack of transfer of the 
entity. Both parties acknowledged the transfer was not made prior 
to trial. 
Prince refers to testimony at trial which sets forth his 
belief, that Income Fund was part of the parties' joint business 
enterprise. 
The statement is simply not true. The following testimony 
took place: 
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(Mr. Prince) "The best explanation I can give, Les, is 
I thought we were partners. It's really that simple. I 
didn't think about Income Fund. I didn't have any idea 
it was such a mammoth income creator. I just thought we 
were partners. . ." (R. 869, L. 19-23) 
It is obvious from the foregoing exchange that Income Fund was 
not even contemplated by Prince until some time after the 
Memorandum Agreement was entered into, and even then, it was not 
discussed as being part of the deal, until Prince realized that it 
may be more than a liability, with some basis for income as well. 
When Mr. Prince was examined regarding his understanding of 
what ownership, he had if any of Income Fund, he recited the 
following exchange from his deposition: 
A: So at that point I would have owned whatever 
Healeys owned in Income Fund so after, I guess 
I would assume I owned it before— I know— I guess 
before that — I guess I wouldn't have owned it. 
(R. 869, L. 10-13) 
There is no contradictory testimony to that cited above, and 
yet the Court seems to come to the conclusion that there was a 
willful, intentional withholding of Income Fund, by Mr. Healey, and 
yet even Mr. Prince believed that prior to the Memorandum Agreement 
he did not have any ownership interest in Income Fund, except for 
his limited partner shares, for which he had received identical 
payments as to those shares owned by Mr. Healey. 
At trial, based upon the evidence, Judge Frederick made the 
finding that Income Fund was an entity that should have been 
transferred under the terms of the Memorandum Agreement. 
Subsequent to trial, Healey has done everything to transfer 
his interest in Income Fund, and that transfer is not an issue for 
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the appellate Court to address. 
REPLY NO. 2 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO SHOW THE FAILURE OF HEALEY 
TO TRANSFER INCOME FUND WAS DONE IN BAD FAITH 
Prince feels the need to argue matters not before this Court, 
by asserting that the failure of Healey to transfer Income Fund was 
done in bad faith, and therefore such behavior excused all other 
aspects of performance of the Memorandum Agreement. 
As set forth in Healey's original brief, the evidence and 
testimony is voluminous that there were numerous entities which the 
parties acted as partners together, and Prince and Healey 
acknowledged that there were numerous entities, all of which were 
difficult to grasp. It is one thing for the Court to conclude that 
Income Fund should have been included in the transfer of 
partnership assets, but for the Court to reach the conclusion that 
Healey's failure to include Income Fund in the transfer of assets 
was done in bad faith is simply not supported by the evidence. In 
Prince's Second Argument he attempts to recite the Conclusions of 
Law and Findings of Fact which set forth Judge Frederick's ruling 
that the actions of Healey were done in bad faith, and further, 
that such actions were a breach of fiduciary duty by Healey. 
However, Prince makes no recitation to the record of any evidence 
which supports those bold conclusions and findings. As set forth 
numerous times, and as the principal basis for this appeal, there 
were simply insufficient facts to allow and otherwise permit the 
trial court to come to the conclusions that it did. 
In page 23 of Prince's Brief, an additional redundant argument. 
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is made that as a General Partner of Income Fund, Healey caused a 
demand letter to be delivered to Prince for the payment of 
$696,500.00. The demand letter was delivered on behalf of limited 
partners and had nothing to do with Healey. This action has no 
relevance, and what Prince failed to point out, as supported by 
uncontroverted evidence, is that Healey was the General Partner of 
Income Fund at Prince's insistence, and was not entitled to any 
more of the distributions from Income Fund than Prince, since both 
parties held identical limited partnership shares. The demand 
letter in questions was in response to threats by other limited 
partners, with whom, both Prince and Healey would be equally 
liable. The demand letter in question was no more directed to 
Prince than to Healey. Healey would ultimately be responsible for 
any monies paid to other limited partners in the same proportion as 
Prince. In addition, Prince denied at all times, prior to any 
litigation, that there were any lease agreements which were signed 
beyond the original five year period, thereby excusing Prince of 
any further obligations. Those issues are contained in a 
completely separate lawsuit, and any reference herein is irrelevant 
to those issues presented to this Court. Once again, it is the 
blatant effort on the part of Prince to confound and otherwise 
circumvent the issues relevant to this appeal. 
In addressing the issue of whether or not a material breach 
occurred, on page 25 of Prince's Brief, reference is made to "The 
trial court's conclusion of law in question was based upon Healey's 
refusal to convey those interest and Healey's failure to disclose 
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his prior financial self-dealings. When those elements are 
combined there is no question that a material breach occurred." 
The foregoing statement is not only offensive to Healey, but 
blatantly wrong, and not even part of the Court record. There was 
no discussion, evidence or testimony in regard to "Healey's prior 
financial self-dealings". Once again, a transparent attempt by 
Prince to circumvent the evidence and place statements before this 
Court which are simply not in existence. If in fact such evidence 
exists to support the findings of the Court, then why has Prince 
failed to set them forth in his argument? 
REPLY NO. 3 
PRINCE HAS FAILED TO ADDRESS THE 
DISTRIBUTIONS FROM INCOME FUND 
In Prince's Fifth Argument, beginning on page 28 of his brief, 
Prince attempts to justify the determination of the trial court in 
finding that the distributions from Income Fund were not equal to 
both parties. Such contention is not supported by the evidence. 
The evidence, as marshalled in the best possible view to Prince, as 
set forth in the brief of Prince at page 29 was that Healey 
received $13,750.00 more than Prince because he was the General 
Partner of Income Fund. It was at the insistence of Prince that 
Healey serve as General Partner of Income Fund, and it was never an 
issue at trial that Healey acted improperly or inappropriately as 
the general partner. (R. 667-668 L. 23-5). Without explanation, 
the trial court found that in regard to Income Fund, Healey 
received $117,073.50 more than Prince, and awarded judgment for 
one-half of the amount ($58,536.75). Even in the brief of Prince, 
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he does not advance any evidence, testimony, documents or even 
argument to justify the actions of the trial court. Even assuming, 
arguendo, that Healey was not entitled to the additional 
$13,750.00, as a general partner, judgment should have been entered 
for one-half of the $13,750.00, or $6,875.00, not $58,536.75. As 
further arguments are set forth, it becomes more obvious that the 
trial court simply adopted and otherwise signed the Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as submitted by Prince, 
without any thought or contemplation of its own. 
REPLY NO. 4 
PRINCE DOES NOT DISPUTE THAT THE 
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT AGAINST HEALEY 
IN THE SUM OF $181,151.22 WAS IN ERROR 
It is interesting that in the counterclaim of Prince, an 
accounting is requested, and in opening statements at trial the 
only thing requested was an accounting. At the conclusion of 
trial, even though Prince himself testified that misappropriation 
of partnership assets by Healey had never been a concern to him, 
the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by 
Prince contained language and assertions for conversion and 
misappropriation of funds and partnership assets. The record is 
void as to any evidence to show misappropriation or conversion of 
partnership funds or assets. 
From the very beginning of trial as contained in Prince's 
opening statement, the only thing requested by Prince is an 
accounting of the partnership assets. (R. 612, L.21-23). 
A substantial portion of Healey's original brief was directed 
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towards the improper entry of judgment against Healey in the sum of 
$181,151.22. The judgment amount of $181,151.22 was based upon 
receipt by Healey of partnership funds in the sum of $362,302.44 
which were paid out for the benefit of partnership debts and 
obligations belonging to Healey and Prince. Prince had complete 
and total knowledge of the funds, and it was at his insistence that 
the transaction take place. At trial, there was no dispute as to 
how the monies were spent, and no dispute and disagreement by 
Prince that those monies were in fact paid towards joint debts and 
obligations which benefitted Prince and Healey. Even now, Prince 
does not have any dispute with the arguments set forth in the 
original brief of Healey, and has not directed any portion of this 
brief towards rebuttal of those arguments. Without any dispute 
between the parties, how can the Court come to the conclusion that 
over $362,000.00 was taken by Healey? 
Prince now finds himself in the unenviable position to defend 
the actions of the trial court, which actions are not supported by 
credible evidence. In the brief of Prince, there is no showing 
which would contradict the evidence and those arguments set forth 
in Healey's Brief, under Point Three. 
On page 43 of Prince's Brief, the conclusive statement is made 
that "Substantial evidence exists in the record that supports the 
trial court's determination that Healey converted Prince's interest 
in monies received by the partnership or distributed from the 
partnership ventures and those findings and the conclusions of law 
related thereto should be upheld on appeal." Prince is correct in 
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the assertion that it is the duty and obligation of appellant to 
marshall the evidence in a manner to support the trial court. 
However, if Prince believes that Healey failed to marshall existing 
evidence, it would seem prudent for Prince to point out that same 
evidence which he believes was not properly marshalled. It is 
impossible, even for Mr. Prince, to marshall evidence which simply 
does not exist. 
Even assuming the Court was justified in its decision to find 
in favor of Prince, the only monies argued by Prince, which 
argument was not that said monies were "converted" or 
"misappropriated", but rather only unexplained, was the sum of 
$117,000.00. The Court, at best, was justified in entering 
judgment against Healey in the sum of $58,500.00. (One-half of 
$117,000.00). As stated earlier, the judgment against Healey in 
the sum of almost $240,000.00 is not supported by credible 
evidence, and has even been admitted by Prince to be an improper 
amount. Prince has remained silent on the issue of judgments 
entered against Healey, for the obvious reason that he is in 
agreement that the trial Court erred in entering those judgments. 
REPLY NO. 5 
THE VALUE OF THE PARTNERSHIP HAS NO 
RELEVANCE TO THIS APPEAL 
In the Sixth Argument of Prince's Brief, Prince asserts that 
since Healey failed to submit evidence as to the value of the 
partnership, he is now precluded from having judgment entered in 
his favor to otherwise enforce the Memorandum Agreement. Such an 
argument is ludicrous. The entire purpose of the Memorandum 
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Agreement was to set forth the specific amounts that would be paid 
by each partner, together with their understanding as to the 
dissolution of the partnership. The idea that additional proof 
was needed, when all specific amounts were set forth, is without 
logic. 
Early on at trial, it was undisputed that Healey offered to buy 
the interests of Prince for the same amount he was willing to be 
paid. (R. 631, L. 12-20). If Prince believed that he was not 
receiving the proper value of the partnership, or the partnership 
was not worth those amounts, as set forth in the Memorandum 
Agreement, then why did he not accept the offer of Healey to buy 
his interest? The answer is obvious, and that would be that the 
amounts set forth in the Memorandum Agreement to pay to Healey for 
his interests were a bargain. There was no need at trial for 
Healey to set forth any additional values of the partnership. The 
value was set forth in the Agreement itself. 
On pages 44 and 45 of Prince's brief, reference to Karen 
English, a witness called by Prince, and an accountant for Prince 
who examined all of the historical records of the partnership for 
a period of 10 months, was such that she could not reconcile all of 
the accounts, but on cross-examination the following dialogue took 
place: 
Q. Why were you asked to go through all of these 
historical documents? 
A. John (Prince) specifically asked me to put 
together a debt schedule to determine the maturity date 
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of notes, the long-term debts that were appearing on the 
balance sheets and to know what the payment schedules 
were. They were trying to determine when those notes 
would be paid in full. 
Q. Were you ever asked by Mr. Prince to go through 
and find out what payments were made to Mr. Prince and 
what payments were made directly to Mr. Healey? 
A. No. 
Q. Did Mr. Prince ever indicate to you that Mr. 
Healey had taken funds from the partnership that he was 
not entitled to? 
A. No. 
Q. Did he (Prince) ever ask you to go through all 
of the records and see if there was an inequality of 
distribution between Mr. Prince and Mr. Healey? 
A. No. (R. 1080, L. 6-25; R. 1080 L. 1) 
In addition to the foregoing testimony, the Court accepted the 
proffer of Yvonne Failner who was the accountant for both parties, 
during their partnership relations. Yvonne Failner would testify 
that it was her job to physically prepare and deliver all checks of 
the partnership, and above all other things, she would always make 
certain that the checks payable to Mr. Prince and Mr. Healey were 
equal for the partnership management fees. (R. 1094, L. 18-25). 
As stated earlier, there can be no misappropriation of 
partnership monies when there was not one witness, including those 
called by Mr. Prince who testified to any misappropriation. Any 
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finding or conclusion by the Court that a conversion of partnership 
assets took place by Healey is simply without evidentiary and legal 
basis. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not have sufficient evidence to determine 
that the Memorandum Agreement was null and void, and further that 
money judgment in the approximate amount of $240,000.00 should have 
been entered against Healey. Even in the arguments propounded by 
Prince there is no argument or disagreement that the money 
judgments entered by the trial court were in error. 
The proper remedy for the appellate court is to either remand 
this matter for new trial or to vacate the judgment entered and 
order enforcement of the Memorandum Agreement, executed by the 
parties herein. The one constant factor, agreed to by both 
parties, is that they executed the Memorandum Agreement with the 
expectation of being bound to the terms thereof. 
DATED this f, d, day of February? 1994. 
:<7 
Les F. 'Engl^ i&r 
Attorney for Appellant 
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